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  Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact of bank consolidations promoted by government policy, using 
data from pre-war Japan when the Ministry of Finance promoted bank consolidations by dint of the 
Bank Law of 1927. It is found that policy-promoted consolidation had a positive effect on deposit 
growth, especially in the period when the financial system was unstable. On the other hand, it had a 
negative effect on profitability, particularly when there was no dominant bank among the 
participants or when more than two banks participated in the consolidation. Policy-promoted 






  2  
1.Introduction 
In recent years, a wave of bank consolidations has spread across the world. According to Amel 
(2002), more than 8000 bank consolidations occurred globally between 1990 and 2001 and the total 
value of the deals reached about $1,800 billion. The number and amount of deals increased sharply 
towards the end of the period. In Japan, the reorganization of city banks through consolidations has 
progressed since the end of the 1990s, and has resulted in the formation of three major financial 
groups  At the same time, consolidations between regional financial institutions have progressed 
rapidly. Actually, the number of Shinkin banks, small regional financial institutions, decreased by 
almost 30 % from 1991 to 2004, mainly due to consolidations.   
It is notable that one of the major driving forces of the recent wave of bank consolidations has 
been government policy.  For example, since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the financial 
authorities of Asian countries have been promoting bank consolidations and the Japanese 
government initiated a policy of promoting consolidations among regional financial institutions on 
the grounds that this policy would contribute to the stabilization of the banking system (Berger et al. 
1999; Financial Service Agency, Japan 2002, Shin, 2003).   
Promotion of bank consolidations by the government is not a recent phenomenon. 
Kurgan-van (2001) shows that many of the governments of European countries, including Austria, 
Belgium and Germany, promoted bank consolidations when the financial system was exposed to 
banking crises in the 1920s and 1930s. Also, in 1920s and 1930s Japan, the government actively 
promoted bank consolidations in order to stabilize the financial system when the banking sector 
experienced repeated financial crises. Due to this policy, a number of bank consolidations occurred 
(Goto 1991; Shiratori 2001; Okazaki and Sawada 2003). The central measure used for the 
consolidation promotion policy was the Bank Law of 1927. In this paper, we explore the 
implications of bank consolidations promoted by government policy based on the Bank Law. 
We have rich literature related to this topic. Actually, the recent wave of bank consolidations 
has attracted the interest of researchers and people in the financial authorities and banking industry. 
Bank consolidation has been one of the major topics of research in banking and finance. The main  3  
research foci are the effect of consolidation on efficiency, the market power of the banks involved, 
small business lending, and the systemic risk of the financial system. With respect to the effects of 
bank consolidations on efficiency, there are a number of empirical studies that confirm the risk 
diversifying effect of bank consolidation, based on static and dynamic analyses (Benston et al. 1995; 
Hughes et al. 1996, 1999; Craig and Santos 1997; Demsetzs and Strahan 1997; Saunders and Wilson, 
1999).    In this strand of the literature, it has been suggested that the government could play a role in 
promoting bank consolidations, especially when the banking system is destabilized. For example, 
Berger et al. (1999) argued that the government could promote the consolidation of banks that are 
faced with difficulties or a financial crisis, based on the case of the US Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. The idea underlying the use of a consolidation promotion policy during a financial 
crisis is that bank consolidations would reduce the insolvency risk through asset diversification (Shih 
2003). 
Related to this, the literature on the U.S. banking system in the 1920s and 1930s shows that 
the branch banking system benefited from diversifying credit risk (White, 1983, 1984; Calomiris, 
1992, 1993; Wheelcok, 1992,1993; Mitchener, 2005a). These results are considered to indicate the 
potential benefit of bank consolidation. Meanwhile, White (1985) pointed out the possibility that the 
wave of U.S. bank mergers in 1919-1930 strengthened the banking industry through preventing 
failures of small rural banks as well as through achieving economies of scale. 
     Recent research stresses another channel through which bank consolidation and branch 
banking could contribute to stabilization of the financial system. Carlson and Michener (2005b) 
confirmed that the expansion of statewide branch banking induced competition among banks and 
thereby removed weak and inefficient banks through failures, liquidations and consolidations in the 
U.S. in the 1920s, which consequently improved the stability of the banking system. In addition, 
Carlson and Michener (2005c) show an external effect of branch banking, using the data on 
California in the 1920s and 1930s. That is, many small unit banks were exposed to competition 
induced by the emergence of large branch banking institutions, in particular, the Bank of America, 
and those small unit banks were forced to make efforts to improve efficiency. Consequently, the  4  
banks competing with the Bank of America were better able to survive the shock of the Great 
Depression.  
   On the other hand, most of the empirical literature suggests that bank consolidations do not 
significantly improve the performance or efficiency of the participating banks (Berger et al. 1999; 
Amel et al. 2002). If a voluntary consolidation does not enhance the performance of the participating 
banks, a performance enhancing effect of consolidation promoted by government policy is even 
more questionable, but to our knowledge there has been no empirical study that directly examines 
the issue. Hence, in this paper we intend to investigate the effects of policy-promoted consolidation 
on the stability of the financial system. A basic reason why research on the effects of 
policy-promoted consolidations has not progressed lies in data constraints. Not only are sufficient 
observations of bank consolidations lacking, but it is also difficult to identify consolidations 
promoted by government policy. In order to resolve this problem, we use data from pre-war Japan.   
     As stated above, in the 1920s and 1930s, the Japanese government promoted bank 
consolidations using a minimum capital regulation stipulated by the Bank Law. This case provides us 
with a valuable opportunity to evaluate the effects of the policy. The Bank Law set a minimum 
capital requirement for banks, which many banks did not meet. At the same time, the government 
did not allow any of these small banks to increase capital by itself. Consequently, many small banks 
were obliged to choose one of two alternatives, merge with another bank, or undergo liquidation. 
Hence, we identify bank consolidations promoted by government policy as those in which the capital 
of one of the participating banks was smaller than the minimum capital required by the Bank Law
2.  
     There is another advantage to using data from pre-war Japan. Not only did many bank 
consolidations occur, whether promoted by the policy or not, but these consolidations also took 
various patterns and comprehensive information on these patterns of consolidation is available. As 
the patterns of consolidation in general affect the cost of organizational adjustment, it is necessary to 
control for them in order to identify the effects of the consolidation promotion policy. Also, any 
difference in organizational adjustment costs between the various patterns of consolidation is 
interesting in itself.    5  
     The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of bank consolidations in 
pre-war Japan. Section 3 explains the data and methodology used in the analysis. In section 4, we 
analyze the effects of policy-promoted consolidation. Section 5 explores the effects of 
policy-promoted consolidation in more detail, combining these effects with information on 
consolidation patterns. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Financial crises, the Bank Law and bank consolidations                   
          The structure of the banking industry in pre-war Japan was substantially different from what it 
has been in the post-war period. One of the major differences is that there were numerous banks in 
the pre-war period. This was basically because entry regulations were comparatively lax until the 
early twentieth century. The number of banks was as large as 2334 (1890 ordinary banks and 444 
saving banks) in 1901, the peak year, and after that it started to decline due to market selection and 
the change in government policy. The turning point of the market structure of the banking industry 
was the financial crisis in 1901. Under the crisis, 50 banks were closed, faced with runs, more than 
80 % of which were small banks with capital of less than two hundred thousand yen (Goto, 1968). 
Afterwards, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) adopted a policy whereby the scale of banking was 
enlarged. At first, the model for the MOF to aim for was the branch banking system of the U.K. In 
1901, the MOF set a minimum paid-in capital amount (five hundred thousand yen) a new bank was 
required to have to enter the industry. While gradually raising the minimum capital amounts required 
by newcomers, the MOF requested that local governments promote bank consolidations in the 
1910s.  
     In the 1920s, instability of the financial system became serious with many bank runs and 
failures. In 1920, one of the major banks in Yokohama, Nanaju-yon Bank, failed due to the collapse 
of a speculative bubble, which led to a nation-wide wave of bank runs. Consequently, 169 banks 
were faced with runs, out of which 21 banks were closed (Goto,1968). In 1922, Kochi-shogyo Bank 
was closed due to the failure of its connected borrower, Sadashichi Ishii, an influential speculator. 
The failure of Kochi-shogyo Bank caused a series of bank runs in the Tokyo, Kansai and Kyushu  6  
areas. Furthermore, in 1923, a great earthquake hit the Tokyo and Yokohama areas, which brought 
the financial system to a standstill. The estimated property loss amounted to approximately 30% of 
GNP in 1922, according to the Bank of Japan (1933). Afterwards, many banks in the Tokyo and 
Yokohama areas suffered from bad loan problems. Finally, in 1927, the Finance Minster, Naoharu 
Kataoka, inadvertently mentioned the closure of the Tokyo Watanabe Bank, which precipitated the 
Showa Financial Crisis. This was the largest financial crisis in Japanese financial history. Major 
stock and commodity exchanges were shut down for three weeks. According to a report from the 
Ministry of Finance, the number of closed, nearly closed, and officially suspended banks reached 
126 (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001). A large shift of deposits from banks to the Postal Bureau occurred 
after the crisis.   
The financial crises spurred the MOF to make drastic policy changes to reform the financial 
system. In September 1926, the MOF established the Financial System Research Council (Kin’yu 
Seido Chosakai) to examine measures for reforming the financial system (Bank of Japan 1983, 
pp.264-270). As the base of discussion there, the MOF proposed a draft to the Council, which aimed 
at i) increasing capital, ii) promoting prudential management, iii) protecting depositors, iv) 
improving supervision, v) preventing excess competition, and vi) promoting liquidation of 
non-performing banks. This draft summarizes the recognition shared by the financial authorities and 
the private financial circle of the problems in the financial system. That is, it was widely recognized 
that the market structure with numerous small banks, harsh competition among them, and unsound 
management were the basic reasons for the financial instability
3. Unsound bank management was in 
reference to too small profit reserves, excess reliance on real estate for collaterals, and the unsound 
relationship between banks and non-banking companies, which was called an “organ bank” 
relationship. Many banks were connected with non-banking companies through personnel and 
capital ties and concentrated loans on those related companies (Kato 1957; Okazaki Sawada and 
Yokoyama 2005). 
      The Council examined the draft to prepare a report on the reform of ordinary banks. This 
report recommended that eighteen measures be taken and that the Bank Law be legislated to  7  
implement them (Ogawa 1930 p.34, pp.70-78). Based on the report, the MOF proposed the Draft of 
the Bank Law to the Diet in 1927 to replace the Bank Act of 1890. The main points that were newly 
prescribed by the Bank Law were as follows. First, a bank should be a joint-stock company. Second, 
it should have capital of not less than one million yen in principal. If the headquarters of a bank was 
located in Tokyo or Osaka, the minimum capital requirement was two million yen, while it was five 
hundred thousand yen if the headquarters was located in a town or village with a population not 
larger than ten thousand. Third, a bank should not conduct any other business except closely related 
business, such as setting up and maintaining corporate bond trusts If a bank did not meet these 
criteria at the time of enactment, it should meet them within five years. And fourth, an executive 
director or a manager of a bank should not be an executive director or a manager of another 
company without the approval of the Minister of Finance (Bank of Japan 1983, pp.273-276).   
            It is notable that the first point, regulation of bank capital, gave the MOF a powerful measure 
for promoting bank consolidations. The MOF had made efforts to promote bank consolidations since 
the 1900s, especially since the early 1920s. When the Law was enacted in 1928, there were 1407 
ordinary banks and 807 of these did not meet the minimum capital criterion. On the other hand, the 
MOF held the authority to approve any changes in bank capital required by the Bank Law,
4 and 
basically it did not allow a small bank to increase its capital by itself. Hence, small banks that did not 
meet the minimum capital criterion were obliged to choose from one of two alternatives, 
consolidation with other banks or liquidation.   
          The MOF expected bank consolidations to be an effective measure to resolve the problems of 
the Japanese financial system, not to mention the fact that bank consolidations would be effective in 
reforming the market structure, which consisted of numerous small banks. However, the MOF 
expected more. The MOF considered that bank consolidations would resolve the problems of bank 
management. First, the upscaling of banks through consolidations was supposed to increase the need 
for full-time managers, who were often lacking in small banks because there were scales of economy 
in employing full-time managers. Second, it was expected that consolidations would resolve the 
problem of the “organ bank” relationship (Shiratori 2001)
5. Third, bank consolidations were  8  
supposed to have the effect of diversifying bank assets (Ito 1995).   
   In promoting bank consolidations, the MOF gave priority to those between banks in the same 
regions, which implies that the MOF changed the policy from that of aiming at the British branch 
banking system. This was because local business circles and the Diet members representing them 
complained that consolidations between large urban banks and regional banks would cause transfers 
of funds from rural areas to urban areas (Shiratori 2000; Ogawa 1930, part 2, pp.259-268).  The 
effect of the consolidation promotion policy, in particular the policy backed by the Bank Law, is 
reflected in Figure 1
6. This shows the number of bank exits, classifying them into exits via 
consolidation and exits for other reasons, including failure. We can confirm that consolidations came 
to be the principal reason for bank exits from the late 1910s onwards. The number of bank exits due 
to consolidations reached a peak of 222 in 1928. Around 90% of the consolidations that occurred in 
the late 1920s and in the early 1930s were those whose participants were in the same regions, 
reflecting the above mentioned policy of the MOF. 
  
3 Empirical Methodology 
3.1 Data and samples                     
The basic samples used in the following analyses consist of all the consolidations of ordinary 
banks that occurred in the period from Jan. 1927 to Dec. 1932, when bank consolidations increased 
sharply due to the enactment of the Bank Law. The data source for the bank consolidations is Ginko 
Jiko Geppo (Monthly Bank Affairs), prepared by the Bank of Japan. From this source, we can obtain 
basic information on each bank consolidation, including the event date, the names of the 
participating banks, the prefectures where their head offices were located, the capital of the 
pre-consolidation and post-consolidation banks, and the form of consolidation. In this source, bank 
consolidations are classified into three forms, namely absorption, acquisition and combination into a 
new bank. Here, combination into a new bank refers to the form of consolidation where a new bank 
is  established  after  all  of  the  participants  are  dissolved.                                    
The information on consolidation forms is useful because it allows us to infer the power  9  
balance among the participants. According to Kin’yu Kenkyukai (1934), in a case where the power 
of the participant banks was nearly equal, they tended to combine into a new bank. On the other 
hand, when one bank dominated the other participants, absorption or acquisition tended to be the 
chosen path
7. As Ginko Jiko Geppo distinguishes between the surviving banks and the exiting banks 
after the consolidation, we can easily identify the acquirer bank and the target bank in the absorption 
and acquisition consolidations.   
  The financial data for each bank was obtained from various issues of Ginkokyoku Nenpo (Year 
Book of the Bank Bureau of the Ministry of Finance), which covers all the ordinary banks in Japan. 
However, the information from this source is basically limited to balance sheet data and information 
on profit is censored at zero. That is, if the profit of a bank was negative, the negative value is not 
reported in this source. Hence, we supplemented information on profit, using the financial reports for 
each bank and Ginko Tsushinroku (Bank Report)
8. Meanwhile, since the minimum capital set by the 
Bank Law depended on the location of the headquarters of a bank, as mentioned above, we compiled 
the addresses of the headquarters from Ginko Soran (Handbook of Banks). Also, this source provides 
us with the addresses of the branches of each bank, which we used to classify out-of-market and 
in-market consolidations. The information on the population of the city, town or village where the 
headquarters of each bank was located was obtained from Nippon Teikoku Tokei Nenkan (Statistical 
Year Book of the Japanese Empire). Combining this information with the minimum capital set by the 
Bank Law, we can determine whether each bank met the minimum capital criterion or not. We regard 
consolidation in which at least one participating bank did not meet the minimum capital criterion as 
a policy-promoted consolidation, while we regard consolidation where all the participants met the 
criterion as a strategic consolidation.     
In the rest of the paper, we examine the effects of consolidation on bank performance by 
comparing the changes in performance from year T-1 to year T+2 and T+3, between the consolidated 
banks and the non-consolidated banks, where T refers to the event year when the consolidation 
occurred.  In order to identify the consolidation effects clearly, we exclude banks that participated 
in multiple consolidations in the period from year T-2 to year T+3. After filtering out those samples  10 
from all the consolidations in 1927-1932, 164 consolidation samples remain, in which 393 banks 
were involved
9. Also, we chose control samples for each event year. The control samples 
corresponding to the consolidated banks in year T refer to those banks that did not participate in any 
consolidation in the period from year T-2 to year T+3. For example, the control samples of the event 
year 1927 are the banks that did not participate in any consolidation from 1925 to 1930. We compare 
these with the banks that were consolidated in 1927. Then, we construct (unbalanced) panel data, 
which consists of 2186 bank-event year observations.     
Panel A of Table 1 shows the number of consolidations and control samples by event year. 
The  consolidations are classified as policy-promoted consolidations and strategic consolidations, 
according to the definition stated above. Around 80% of the consolidations are classified as 
policy-promoted consolidations. In Panels B to E of Table 1, we further classify policy-promoted 
consolidations and strategic consolidations into subcategories according to a separate set of criteria. 
In Panel B we add the criterion of consolidation forms mentioned above, namely absorption, 
acquisition and combination into a new bank. The additional criterion in Panel C is the number of 
participating banks. It is notable that the ratio of one-to-one consolidation was substantially higher in 
strategic consolidations than in policy-promoted consolidations.   
In Panel D, we add the criteria of in-market and out-of-market consolidation. Out-of-market 
consolidation refers to consolidation where there were no branch offices overlapping in the same 
market among the participating banks
10. Over 75% of the total  samples were in-market 
consolidations. It should be noted that the ratio of in-market consolidations was substantially higher 
in policy-promoted consolidations than in strategic consolidations, which is consistent with the fact 
that the government placed priority on regional consolidations. Finally, we add the criterion of the 
area where the headquarters was located after the consolidation. We distinguish between urban and 
rural areas. Urban areas refer to the prefectures of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Kyoto, Osaka and 
Hyogo. The proportion of consolidations in rural areas was 75% of total samples.   
 
3.2 Methodology    11 
    In measuring bank performance, we focus on the deposit growth rate and the return on total 
assets (ROA)
11. The deposit growth rate is a performance measure closely related to the stability of 
the financial system. In pre-war Japan, depositors were wary of the risks associated with banks 
because there was no deposit insurance system. In fact, bank runs frequently occurred in the 1920s, 
including the Showa Financial Crisis in 1927
12. Arguably, the benefits of consolidation were 
potentially greater in this situation because the consolidation not only increased the scale of the bank 
but also enabled the bank to diversify its assets more extensively, which in turn decreased the risk for 
the depositors (Benston et al. 1995; Hughes et al. 1996,1999; Craig and Santos 1997; Demsetzs and 
Strahan 1997; Saunders and Wilson 1999, etc.). On the other hand, Shih (2003) points out the 
possibility that when a relatively healthy bank merges with a weak one, the post-merger bank can be 
a proposition that is still more risky than the weak one. However, his argument is based on the 
assumption that the average credit risk of the two merging banks is extremely high, and this 
assumption cannot be applied to the situation of the banking industry in pre-war Japan, even in the 
1920s and 1930s
13.    
          A number of researchers have used ROA to ascertain the effect of consolidation, but the results 
are mixed (Berger and Humphrey 1992; Cornett and Tehranian 1992; Linder and Crane 1992; Piloff 
1996; Rodes 1998). In addition, many of our consolidation samples are policy-promoted ones, which 
were not always carried out as a result of strategic incentives. Hence, it is unlikely that 
consolidations in our samples would have a positive effect on ROA. One problem with ROA is that 
it reflects both market power and efficiency (Akhavein et al. 1997; Berger et al. 1999). Although 
ideally both the change in the profitability ratio and profit efficiency should be analyzed, we focus 
on the former due to data constraints. However, as stated below, we found that consolidations had a 
negative effect on ROA, which indicates that consolidations led to inefficiencies, and that this 
dominated the effect of increased market power, if any such increase occurred. In this sense, the 
problem of market power was not particularly serious. 
In order to measure the effect of consolidation, we estimate equation (1) by pooled OLS 
with samples from all event years, using event year dummies to control for the shocks common to  12 
the samples of the same event year group. Also, in calculating standard error, the 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard error by White (1980) is used.   
⊿ it it it it it it URBAN BRANCH ASSET LN CONS X ε β β β β β + + Δ + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 ) (     (1) 
where i refers to the bank, and t refers to the event year group. The dependent variable⊿ it X is the 
difference in ROA or the deposit growth rate in the period from year T-1 to year T+2 orT+3
14. For 
the value of a consolidated bank in year T-1, that of a pro-forma bank is used
15. CONS is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the bank was a merged one, and 0, otherwise. We are especially interested in 
the coefficient of this variable. If the consolidation had a positive effect on bank performance, the 
coefficient is expected to be positive with respect to both dependent variables. LN(ASSET) is the 
natural log of the total assets in year T-1, and is expected to capture the economies of scale. ⊿
BRANCH denotes the change in the number of branches. In the case where the dependent variable is 
ROA, we expect this variable to capture the effect of restructuring inefficient branches since the 
government in principle prohibited the opening of new branches from the early 1920s. If effective 
restructuring was accomplished, the sign of this coefficient will be negative. With respect to the 
deposit growth rate, the coefficient of ⊿BRANCH is expected to be positive because, in general, 
the correlation between ability to collect deposits and the number of branches is positive. URBAN is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 where the headquarters of the bank was located in an urban area, in 
the sense defined above, and 0, otherwise. In an equation where the deposit growth rate is the 
dependent variable, the coefficient of URBAN is expected to be positive, since it is known that there 
was a tendency for funds to flow from rural areas to urban areas after the 1900s (Okazaki 1993; 
Shiratori 2000).   
Table 2 shows the basic statistics on the pre-consolidation banks. With respect to absorption 
and acquisition, we split samples into acquirer banks and target banks. According to the table, the 
acquirer banks were larger in terms of assets than the other banks. Also, the loan-deposit ratio 
(Loan/Deposits) of the acquirer banks was lower. On the other hand, the target banks and 
participants combined into new banks had relatively high ROA, which arguably reflects that those 
banks were more or less monopolistic in the segmented local markets.
16  13 
 
4 The effects of policy-promoted consolidation 
    In this section, we examine the effects of policy-promoted consolidation on bank performance 
as a way of revealing the effect of the Bank Law of 1927. Table 3 shows the result of panel 
regressions of equation (1) with the deposit growth rate from one year before the consolidation (T-1) 
to two or three years after the consolidation (T-2 or T-3) as the dependent variable. Columns 1 and 3 
show the results of the performance change from T-1 to T+2, and Columns 2 and 4 show those from 
T-1 to T+3. According to Column 1, the coefficient of the consolidation dummy is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that the deposit growth rate of the consolidated 
banks was 6.388% points higher that that of the non-consolidated banks in the period from T-1 to 
T+2. Since the sample period includes the Showa Financial Crisis in 1927 and the financial system 
did not have a deposit insurance system, the depositors were expected to be aware of any risks 
associated with the bank. The positive coefficient of the consolidation dummy is supposed to reflect 
the fact that the consolidation was seen by depositors as reducing credit risk. The coefficient of 
LN(ASSET) is also positive and statistically significant, which is consistent with our interpretation 
based on the risk-averse behavior of the depositors. URBAN has no significant impact on the deposit 
growth rate. Hence, there is no evidence of fund flight from rural to urban areas, as was pointed out 
by former studies. The coefficient of ⊿BRANCH is, as expected, positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that branches played a significant role in collecting deposits
17. 
Column 2 shows the same result qualitatively as that in Column 1, whereas the magnitude and 
statistical significance of the coefficient of the consolidation dummy is slightly smaller, and the 
coefficient of LN(ASSET) is larger.   
    In Columns 3 and 4, we split the consolidation samples into policy-promoted consolidations 
and strategic ones in order to identify the effect of the consolidation promotion policy. These results 
show that while the coefficient of the policy-promoted consolidation dummy is positive and 
statistically significant, that of strategic consolidation is positive but not significant. Moreover, the 
magnitudes of these coefficients are larger in the former than in the latter. Hence, we can say that the  14 
deposit growth rate went up, particularly in cases where consolidation was promoted by government 
policy.  
In order to explore the reasons for the positive effect of consolidation on deposit growth in 
more detail, we conducted a cross sectional analysis. That is, we estimated equation (1) by event 
year. The result where the performance change was measured from one year before the consolidation 
to one year after the consolidation is shown in Panel A. Panels B and C show the results where the 
performance change was measured from one year before the consolidation to two and three years 
after the consolidation, respectively. According to these panels, the consolidations in 1927, when the 
Showa Financial Crisis occurred, had a strong positive effect on the deposit growth rate. Those 
banks that consolidated in 1927 collected over 20% more deposits than the non-consolidated banks. 
Also, the consolidations in 1928 had a positive effect on deposit growth, although it was relatively 
small. On the other hand, the consolidations that occurred in the period from 1929 to 1932 had no 
statistically significant effect. In other words, the positive effect of consolidation on deposit growth 
was observed only in the period when the financial system was especially unstable. This can be 
interpreted as being the risk-averse behavior of depositors that was spurred by the financial crisis 
and thus gave a premium to the consolidation. While not reported, we estimated equation (1) using a 
policy promotion consolidation dummy and strategic consolidation dummy with respect to the years 
1927 and 1928 to confirm that the positive effect was especially large for policy-promoted 
consolidation. 
          One interpretation of the larger effect of policy-promoted consolidation is that 
policy-promoted consolidation aimed at rescuing financially distressed banks. Actually, comparing 
the average loan-deposit ratio between acquiring banks and acquired banks with respect to whether 
they were participants in policy-promoted consolidations, we find that the ratio of the former was 
1.19, while that of the latter was 1.51. In other words, the liquidity position of the acquired banks 
was extremely bad. On the other hand, with respect to strategic consolidations, the average 
loan-deposit ratio of the acquiring banks was 1.00, while that of the acquired banks was 1.18, 
indicating that the liquidity position of the acquired banks was not so bad. Hence, we can infer that  15 
strategic consolidations rarely contributed to the rescue of financially distressed banks. In addition, 
according to Goto (1991), in order to rescue small and weak banks, the Ministry of Finance actively 
coordinated consolidations collaborating with bank managers and leading figures of local business 
circles. In summary, it is likely that the consolidations promoted by the Bank Law mitigated the 
financial crisis. 
    Next, we examine the effect of consolidation on bank profitability. Panel A of Table 5 shows the 
results of panel regressions of Equation (1) with change in ROA from one year before the 
consolidation (T-1) to two or three years after the consolidation (T-2 or T-3) as the dependent 
variable. As shown in Columns 1 and 2, the consolidation dummy is negative and statistically 
significant, which means that consolidation had a negative effect on bank profitability. Since, as 
stated above, consolidation would more or less increase market power, the negative effect suggests 
that consolidation was accompanied by inefficiencies. This is not surprising, because most of the 
literature on bank consolidations in the 1980s and 1990s rejects any significantly positive effect of 
consolidations on profitability and efficiency (Berger et al. 1999; Amel et al. 2002).     
    Meanwhile, LN(ASSET) and URBAN had a positive effect on ROA
18. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of ⊿BRANCH is, contrary to our expectation, positive. It is possible that those banks 
whose profitability declined were obliged to decrease their number of branches, however, the 
positive effect of restructuring branch networks was not large enough to offset that correlation.         
In the same way as for the analysis of deposit growth rate (Table3), we focus on the effect of 
policy-promoted consolidation on ROA. As shown in Columns 3 and 4, the coefficient of the 
policy-promoted consolidation dummy is negative and statistically significant. On the other hand, 
that of the strategic consolidation dummy is positive, although it is not significant. These results 
imply that we can attribute the negative effect of the consolidation on ROA to policy-promoted 
consolidation.  
Finally, we have to mention that the number of observations is smaller by 212 (9.7%), 
compared to the analysis of the deposit growth rate, because we eliminated banks whose information 
on negative profit was not available from our samples
19. Hence, it is possible that the estimation  16 
results in Table 5 are affected by sample selection bias. Therefore, we re-estimated equation (2) with 
the sample selection model by using the maximum likelihood (ML) method, where the selection 
equation consists of variables explaining the cross sectional differences in bank profits
20. The 
estimated results are shown in Panel B of Table 5. We can confirm that the results are not 
substantially different when compared to those of Panel A
2122.    
 
5 Consolidation patterns and bank performance   
   In the previous section, we confirmed that policy-promoted consolidation had a positive 
effect on deposit growth rate and that it had a negative effect on ROA, which suggests that some 
inefficiencies occurred. In this section, we investigate the causes of these results in more detail. For 
this purpose, we focus on three patterns of consolidation that are relevant to bank performance. That 
is, (1) the form of consolidation absorbing consolidations vs. mergers of equals, (2) the number of 
participating banks, and (3) in-market consolidations vs. out-of-market consolidations. Then, we 
split policy-promoted and strategic consolidation into sub-categories based on these patterns.   
(1) The form of consolidation. Integration of different organizations is generally 
accompanied by coordination costs. The magnitude of the cost is likely to depend on the form of the 
consolidation. Berger et al. (1999) point out that the reason why cost efficiency was not improved by 
the consolidations in the 1980s was that the gains from the consolidation were offset by such 
coordination costs as difficulties in managing large organizations, conflicts between different 
corporate cultures, and problems in integrating systems. Compared with an absorbing consolidation, 
coordination costs are expected to be higher in the case of mergers of equals, because in the latter 
situation a dominant participant and leadership is lacking
2324. Here, we regard absorptions and 
acquisitions as described in Ginko Jiko Geppo as absorbing consolidations, and regard combination 
into a new bank as a merger of equals. 
(2) The number of participants (one-to-one consolidation versus consolidation with more 
than two participants). In general, the more participants there are, the more difficult it is to integrate 
organizations
25. (3) In-market consolidation versus out-of-market consolidation. It has been pointed  17 
out that geographic expansion of the business area and branch network reduces the risk of bank 
insolvency (Hughes et al., 1999). On the other hand, it is likely that in-market consolidation may 
enhance profitability through restructuring inefficient branches and increasing market power (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1992 etc.). 
Combining the criteria (1)-(3) with the classification distinguishing between policy-promoted 
consolidations and strategic consolidations, we arrive at twelve subcategories of consolidation 
patterns. We estimated equation (1), using a dummy variable that denotes each consolidation pattern 
subcategory. Table 6 shows the estimated results. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the change in 
ROA
26. In Columns 1 and 2, we classify each of the policy-promoted consolidations and strategic 
consolidations as either absorbing consolidations or mergers of equals. With respect to 
policy-promoted consolidations, while both coefficients of absorbing consolidations and mergers of 
equals are negative, the latter is larger in absolute value and the statistical significance is relatively 
high. With respect to strategic consolidations, both coefficients of absorbing consolidations and 
mergers of equals are different from zero, although the coefficient is positive in the case of absorbing 
consolidations. These results indicate that it was policy-promoted consolidations and mergers of 
equals that suffered from a deterioration in profitability. 
In Columns 3 and 4, we focus on criterion (2) as well as on the criterion for 
policy-promoted/strategic consolidations. With respect to policy-promoted consolidations, both 
coefficients of one-to-one consolidations and consolidations with more than two participants are 
negative and statistically significant. But, the absolute value of the latter case is approximately twice 
as large as that of the former case. On the other hand, with respect to strategic consolidations, neither 
of the coefficients is statistically significant.   
It should be noted that policy-promoted consolidations did not always hurt profitability. 
Policy-promoted consolidations damaged profitability especially in cases where there was no 
dominant participant, or where more than two banks participated in the consolidation. On the other 
hand, with respect to strategic consolidations, there is no evidence that profitability declined for this 
form of consolidation. One possible interpretation of these results is as follows. Some of the  18 
policy-promoted consolidations were carried out with the aim of getting over the immediate crisis 
but lacked a strategic vision for the new organization. Hence, after the consolidation, the merged 
banks suffered from the various organizational problems mentioned above. Also, these problems 
were especially serious where there was no dominant participant, or where more than two banks 
participated in the consolidation.   
In Columns 5 and 6, we focus on criterion (3) as well as on the criterion for 
policy-promoted/strategic consolidations. With respect to policy-promoted consolidations, in-market 
consolidations had an especially large negative effect on profitability. On the other hand, strategic 
and in-market consolidations did not have a significant negative effect on profitability. One possible 
interpretation of these results is that in-market consolidations, by definition, had many overlapping 
braches, which made bank profitability worse because effective restructuring of these branches failed 
to occur.  In particular, policy-promoted consolidations were unlikely to have detailed plans to 
restructure the branch network in advance
27.  Furthermore, it is interesting that the coefficient of 
strategic and out-of-market consolidation is positive and statistically significant. This result indicates 
that bank consolidation could also play an important role as a measure of entry into a new market, 
considering the government principally prohibited new branches from being opened.           
     The same analyses can be performed regarding the deposit growth rate in panel B of Table 6. 
Here, we are especially interested in the criterion for in-market and out-of-market consolidations 
because this criterion is expected to be directly related to the risk for depositors, as explained above.   
Columns 5 and 6 show the estimated results. All of the consolidation dummies have positive 
coefficients, but the magnitude and statistical significance differ markedly among the four patterns. 
In particular, in the case of policy-promoted and out-of-market consolidations, the magnitude of the 
coefficient is large. Thus, the banks that underwent this form of consolidation gathered over 10% 
more deposits than the non-merged banks. This result, namely that out-of-market consolidation had 
an especially large positive effect on deposit growth, is consistent with the risk averse behavior of 
depositors.  
     Although the form of consolidation and the number of participants is not considered to be  19 
directly related to depositor risk, we also checked these effects and indicate the estimated results in 
Columns 1 through 4. It is confirmed that the policy-promoted and merger of equals and 
policy-promoted and one-to-one consolidation subcategories have a strong positive effect on deposit 
growth rate, indicating that not all policy-promoted consolidation has a strongly positive effect on 
the deposit growth rate.     
 
6 Concluding Remarks 
  In pre-war Japan, the banking industry was composed of numerous small banks, which led to 
instability of the financial system. In this situation, the Ministry of Finance promoted bank 
consolidations based on a minimum capital criterion for banks set by the Bank Law of 1927. After 
the Law was enacted in 1928, bank consolidations surged. This event provides us with a valuable 
opportunity to explore the effects of the consolidation promotion policy.   
In this paper, we identified bank consolidations that occurred as a result of government 
policy by referring to the minimum capital of the bank and examined the effects of policy-promoted 
consolidations in comparison with other consolidations. It is confirmed that policy-promoted 
consolidations had a substantial positive effect on deposit growth. In addition, the positive effect was 
especially large in 1927 and 1928, when the financial system was faced with a major crisis. On the 
other hand, with respect to profitability, policy-promoted consolidations had a negative effect, 
especially in cases where many banks were involved in the consolidation, where there was no 
dominant participant, or where the participating banks had operated in the same market. From these 
results, we can infer the possibility that policy-promoted consolidations mitigated the financial crisis 
by enhancing the ability of the bank to collect deposits, under the condition that the financial system 
was exposed to serious negative shocks. However, we should also acknowledge the negative aspects 
of policy-promoted consolidations. They were likely to be accompanied by large organizational costs 
and lowered bank profitability. Finally, it should be noted that our research only focused on short- 
term effects, namely those that emerged three years after the consolidation. At the moment, it is 
difficult to capture long-term effect due to data restriction. Exploring long-term effects remains an  20 
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1This paper is a product of a research project undertaken by the authors at the Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). We would like to thank Professor Yasushi Hamao, Takeo 
Hoshi, Anil Kashyap and other participants at the NBER Japan Project Meeting (September 2003, 
Tokyo) for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are the authors’ responsibility.       
2  Teranishi (2004) investigates the relationship between bank lending and bank consolidation after 
the Bank Law of 1927. However, his study does not capture the policy effect directly for the 
following reasons. First, it does not identify whether each consolidation was promoted by the Bank 
Law or not. Second, it does not use the appropriate method to capture the consolidation effect, since 
his analysis is based on pooled prefecture-level data. Therefore, he cannot make a comparison 
between a consolidated bank and a control sample, nor can he capture the dynamic effects in the  25 
                                                                                                                                                  
period ranging from the pre-consolidation year to the post-consolidation year.                       
3  “Waga Kuni Futsu Ginko Seido no Kaizen ni kansuru Gutaiteki Hosaku” “Concrete measures for 
Improving the Ordinary Bank System in Japan” by the members of the Preparing Committee for the 
Financial System Research Council (Ogawa 1930, part1, pp.11-13); The Research Bureau of the 
Bank of Japan, “Sekai Senso Shurogo niokeru Honpo Zaikai Doyo Shi,” (History of the 
Disturbances of the Japanese Economy after the First World War) (Bank of Japan 1958).   
4  This authority was inherited from the Bank Act of 1890. 
5  See footnote 24 for details. 
6  In 1923, the MOF announced “The Policy on Bank Regulation,” which stated that the 
establishment of a new bank or a new bank branch would not be approved in principle, and that bank 
consolidations would be promoted. Also, in 1924, the MOF requested regional governments to 
promote bank consolidations in the same region. When the Bank Law was enacted, the MOF 
increased the number of bank inspectors from six to eighteen and instructed them to promote bank 
consolidations in collaboration with regional business circles (Goto 1968; Ito 2002). 
7  The government promoted combination into a new bank if there was no sound and leading bank 
among the banks undergoing consolidation (Sugiyama 1982).   
8  Not all of the data censored at zero can be covered by those additive sources. Hence, in the 
analysis of profitability (Tables 5, 6), we eliminate those banks whose information on negative profit 
is not available from our samples. We discuss the selection bias from this sample selection in the 
next section. 
9  If we take a longer interval, we lose many consolidation samples.   
10  The unit of a market here is a city or a county.   
11  We cannot get an accurate value of total assets because the account of net borrowings from the 
BOJ and other banks was unrecorded in Ginkokyoku Nenpo. However, it is expected that this will 
not matter because it is pointed out by Wang (2004) that this account was relatively small.         
12  Yabushita and Inoue (1993) established that if a bank was in poor financial condition, this 
increased the probability of closure during the Showa Financial Crisis in 1927, and argued that 
selection through the market mechanism worked efficiently and that there was no self-fulfilling run 
on the banks. On the other hand, Korenaga et al. (2001) split the period of the Showa Financial 
Crisis into two sub-periods, and confirmed that while in the first sub-period there were no 
self-fulfilling runs, the bank runs in the second sub-period were self-fulfilling. 
13  He supported the assumption upon which his model was based, pointing out that even in late 1998 
the non-performing loan ratio at Indonesian banks was still 50-100%.   
14  Since consolidations were often accompanied by asset reevaluation, we adjust the assets of the 
post-consolidation bank in the following way.  3 2 1 , ),i ASSET (ASSET ASSET ASSET T i T T
*
i T = − + = + − +   26 
                                                                                                                                                  
15  The value of the pro-forma bank indicates the sum of the balance sheets of participating banks.   
16  Imuta (1976) and Teranish (1982) pointed out that while small-sized banks had market power in 
segmented country areas to some extent, medium-sized banks were frequently exposed to 
competition with large banks in urban areas.     
17  Based on the deposit and loan data of Mitsubishi Bank by branch, Okazaki (2002) shows that the 
increase in the number of branches in the 1920s and 1930s contributed to the increase of deposits.     
18  The fact that bank scale had a positive effect on ROA indicates the potential benefit of 
consolidations. Since, in our estimation, the value of a pro-forma bank is used with respect to the 
merged banks, the scale effect of the consolidation is controlled for. We also estimated equation (1) 
using the average value of assets of participant banks instead of a pro-forma value. In this case, as 
expected, the consolidation had a greater positive effect on the deposit growth rate and a smaller 
negative effect on ROA.       
19  See footnote 8. The excluded observations include 12 consolidation samples (8 policy-promoted 
consolidations and 4 strategic ones). 
20  The number of branches may explain cross sectional differences in bank profits. However, we 
exclude this variable from the selection equation because it is highly correlated with LN(ASSET). 
But, the estimated results were not changed greatly, even if we included the number of branches in 
the selection equation.   
21  We also estimated the sample selection model using the two-step method by Heckman (1979). 
However, the estimated results are the same as those found using the maximum likelihood (ML) 
method (Panel B of Table5).   
22  Our estimation results may also be exposed to another selection bias since we did not include 
banks that exited through failures and dissolutions in estimating Equation (1). Thus, we estimated 
the same sample selection models as above, supplementing the data for the end of year T-2 for banks 
exiting from the market from T-1 to T+3. The estimated impact of consolidation remains statistically 
significant with respect to both dependent variables (deposit growth rate and change in ROA).         
23  According to Sugiyama (1982), since the banks established through combination into a new bank 
were faced with difficulties in determining new directors, they frequently invited outsiders to take up 
the position.   
24  Moreover, as was expected by the government, if a small bank became one of the branches of a 
large bank as a result of an absorbing consolidation, it is supposed that any unsound loans from the 
acquired bank to its related firm would be reduced due to the discipline of the large bank. Actually, 
Okazaki, Sawada and Wang (2005) confirmed that the absorbing consolidation had an effect of 
excluding unsound relationships of acquired banks with non-banking companies, based on data on 
director interlocking in pre-war Japan.        27 
                                                                                                                                                  
25Sanwa Bank (1974) describes the internal conflicts that Sanwa Bank suffered immediately 
following the consolidation in 1933. Sanwa Bank, the predecessor to UFJ Bank, was established 
through a consolidation of three large banks.     
26  We also estimated these models with the sample selection model shown in the previous section. It 
was confirmed that the results were not greatly changed by sample selection bias. 
27  The number of branches for policy-promoted consolidations decreased by 0.86 (1.16) on average 
two (three) years after the consolidation, it decreased by 3.27 (3.41) for strategic consolidations. Source: Goto,  Honpo, Table 33, 52, 98, 136, 156.








1902 1904 1906 1908 1910 1912 1914 1916 1918 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938
Year
Number of exits
Total Failure or Dissolution
Transformation into saving bank ConsolidationTable1 Sample description 
Panel A: Number of samples by event year 
Number of consolidations
All Strategic Control samples
Event Year (Non-consolidated)
1927 26 21 5 474
1928 41 30 11 389
1929 31 25 6 260
1930 18 11 7 275
1931 22 20 2 296
1932 26 21 5 328
Total 164 128 36 2022
Panel B:  Form of consolidation
Form Absorption Acquisition
Policy-promoted 35 50 43
Strategic 13 14 9
Total 48 64 52
Panel C: Number of participants
 Number of participants 2 3 4 5 More than 5
Policy-promoted 96 19 3 6 4
Strategic 33 2 1 0 0
Total 129 21 4 6 4











into a new bank
Policy-
promotedTable2 Basic Statistics on pre-consolidation banks
Acquirer banks Target banks
Participants in
combination




Mean 42695.54 3912.19 2085.59 14122.24
Median 4631.06 854.34 1523.47 2606.55
Std.dv. 161416.70 13986.97 2154.03 84291.87
Deposits (1000 yen)
Mean 21347.77 1956.09 1042.79 7058.12
Median 2315.53 427.17 761.74 1303.27
Std.dv. 80708.35 6993.49 1077.02 42107.38
Loans/Deposits
Mean 1.15 1.44 1.45 1.39
Median 1.08 1.14 1.24 1.13
Std.dv. 0.52 1.15 1.38 2.50
Mean 3.69 4.86 4.53 3.80
Median 3.03 3.69 4.16 3.12
Std.dv. 2.71 7.33 3.83 4.22
Number of branches
Mean 7.88 1.65 1.84 4.20
Median 3.00 0.00 1.00 2.00
Std.dv. 15.59 3.12 2.72 8.12
Operating  Area
Urban Area (%) 28.6 27.8 12.8 24.6
Rural  Area (%) 71.4 72.2 87.2 75.4
Number of banks 112 133 148 2022
Total assets (1000yen)
Return on assets (%)Table 3 Effect of consolidation on deposit growth 
Dependent variable Deposit growth rate from T-1 to T+2 or T+3
Window [T-1, T+2] [T-1, T+3] [T-1, T+2] [T-1, T+3]
[1] [2] [3] [4]
CONS 6.3884 a 5.0485 c
(2.3446) (2.75)
7.2883 a 5.3867 c
(2.6431) (3.17)
Strategic consolidation 3.0331 3.7888
(4.4263) (4.6223)
LN(ASSET) 1.7269 b 3.4457 a 1.7601 b 3.4586 a
(0.7014) (0.7468) (0.7024) (0.7482)
URBAN -0.6769 -1.9882 -0.709 -2.0003
(2.5832) (2.7015) (2.5854) (2.7037)
⊿BRANCH 2.9804 a 3.5025 a 2.9679 a 3.4991 a
(0.5046) (0.52) (0.5062) (0.5226)
INTERCEPT -23.2484 b -57.304 a -23.719 b -57.4877 a
(10.1996) (10.9756) (10.2117) (10.9954)
Event Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.063 0.057 0.063 0.057
NOB (consolidated/other) 164/2022 164/2022 164/2022 164/2022
Notes: Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c". 
         The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. 




Panel A: Performance change from T-1 to T+1
Dependent variable: Deposit growth rate
Event year (T) 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932
CONS 20.2501 a 10.6177 b 1.678 1.8323 5.9071 -1.5532
(4.4009) (4.8975) (3.3161) (3.7497) (5.9379) (4.3401)
LN(ASSET) -0.2703 -2.873 -0.401 0.558 1.0987 2.7285 c
(1.5624) (2.6361) (1.4724) (1.2998) (1.0527) (1.2834)
URBAN 0.784 12.9143 -2.1243 2.3552 -2.1675 -2.1029
(4.2555) (12.8087) (3.3616) (2.965) (3.2172) (3.5142)
⊿BRANCH 0.4943 3.1031 a 2.6027 a 3.3218 a 1.0727 2.8303
(1.1883) (0.7729) (0.5145) (0.4534) (0.7383) (1.7648)
INTERCEPT 5.7985 42.4992 1.4481 -25.7888 -37.4093 b -50.8864 b
(22.1121) (38.1374) (22.1272) (19.7086) (15.8675) (19.1716)
R2 0.014 0.018 0.06 0.069 0.024 0.055
NOB (consolidated/other) 26/474 41/389 31/260 18/275 22/296 26/328
Panel B: Performance change from T-1 to T+2
Dependent variable: Deposit growth rate
Event year (T) 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932
CONS 25.3345 a 12.0555 b 1.5768 2.9697 5.8086 -3.2334
(5.8598) (5.1231) (4.3158) (4.9235) (6.5922) (4.6242)
LN(ASSET) 0.1877 -1.2378 -0.5337 2.5944 c 2.8789 b 6.1098 a
(1.5867) (2.1424) (1.5388) (1.5171) (1.338) (1.5689)
URBAN -3.6949 6.4451 0.9599 0.1511 -4.1259 -3.4349
(4.764) (10.1796) (3.772) (3.6248) (3.7899) (4.1279)
⊿BRANCH 1.5476 3.1438 a 2.4576 a 3.5232 a 3.2848 b 4.0848 b
(1.0436) (0.8324) (0.5058) (0.4868) (1.3285) (1.69)
INTERCEPT -1.9117 9.3925 -6.0031 -59.7214 b -57.1077 a -95.4181 a
(22.4874) (31.3836) (23.0249) (23.0983) (20.1615) (23.0336)
R2 0.022 0.018 0.045 0.079 0.084 0.122
NOB (consolidated/other) 26/474 41/389 31/260 18/275 22/296 26/328
Panel C: Performance change from T-1 to T+3
Dependent variable: Deposit growth rate
Event year (T) 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932
CONS 22.0166 a 9.5279 -0.4428 5.9659 5.168 -4.6843
(7.6152) (6.4004) (4.9593) (6.2549) (7.5685) (4.9778)
LN(ASSET) 1.1722 0.7235 2.091 3.8512 b 5.7957 a 7.3843 a
(1.71) (2.0187) (1.7121) (1.8649) (1.5524) (1.9119)
URBAN -5.3442 7.4951 -1.4835 -2.6494 -5.4994 -5.8325
(4.9892) (10.3075) (4.4597) (4.2317) (4.4987) (4.6038)
⊿BRANCH 1.9347 b 2.7135 a 3.0682 a 4.6971 a 4.2788 a 4.859 b
(0.8868) (0.638) (0.836) (0.706) (1.3857) (1.9196)
INTERCEPT -25.5295 -30.1874 -48.4047 c -73.0008 b -95.4664 a -107.885 a
(24.4846) (29.5389) (25.5697) (28.3436) (23.1868) (28.044)
R2 0.022 0.014 0.055 0.103 0.113 0.127
NOB (consolidated/other) 26/474 41/389 31/260 18/275 22/296 26/328
Notes: Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c". 
         The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
         Significance levels are reported for two-tail tests.
Variables: See appendixTable 5  Effect of consolidation on ROA
Panel A  Baseline estimation
Dependent variable Change of ROA from T-1 to T+2 or T+3
Window [T-1, T+2] [T-1, T+3] [T-1, T+2] [T-1, T+3]
[1] [2] [3] [4]
CONS -0.4144 b -0.4836 b
(0.1904) (0.2434)
-0.5856 a -0.6524 b
(0.204) (0.2697)
Strategic consolidation 0.2696 0.1885
(0.3145) (0.3648)
LN(ASSET) 0.2403 a 0.248 a 0.2332 a 0.2407 a
(0.0744) (0.0699) (0.0753) (0.0707)
URBAN 0.491 a 0.5567 a 0.4964 a 0.5622 a
(0.1794) (0.1779) (0.1792) (0.1777)
⊿BRANCH 0.0625 b 0.0595 0.0663 b 0.0621
(0.0308) (0.0466) (0.0311) (0.047)
INTERCEPT -5.0544 a -5.5628 a -4.9521 a -5.4582 a
(1.1012) (1.0593) (1.1129) (1.0701)
Event Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.05 0.08 0.051 0.081
NOB (consolidated/other) 152/1822 152/1822 152/1822 152/1822
Panel B  Adjusting sample selection bias
Dependent variable Change of ROA from T-1 to T+2 or T+3
Window [T-1, T+2] [T-1, T+3] [T-1, T+2] [T-1, T+3]
[1] [2] [3] [4]
CONS -0.4121 b -0.5109 b
(0.1894) (0.2349)
-0.656 a -0.6509 b
(0.2063) (0.2686)
Strategic consolidation 0.1973 0.1899
(0.3195) (0.3631)
LN(ASSET) 0.2416 a 0.2325 a 0.1947 b 0.2415 a
(0.0748) (0.0809) (0.0844) (0.0709)
URBAN 0.4912 a 0.5559 a 0.5021 a 0.5623 a
(0.179) (0.1779) (0.1827) (0.1773)
⊿BRANCH 0.0625 b 0.0578 0.058 c 0.0621
(0.0307) (0.0437) (0.0305) (0.0468)
INTERCEPT -5.0906 a -5.1521 a -3.9698 a -5.4807 a
(1.1121) (1.4027) (1.3089) (1.0779)
(Selection model)
CONS 0.1168 0.1071 0.0562 0.117
(0.1538) (0.1547) (0.1434) (0.1538)
LN(ASSET) 0.0654 b 0.0613 c 0.0495 0.0654 b
(0.0321) (0.0363) (0.0418) (0.0321)
URBAN 0.012 0.0221 0.0495 0.0119
(0.086) (0.095) (0.0873) (0.086)
INTERCEPT 0.2414 0.3012 0.4242 0.2423
(0.4597) (0.513) (0.5742) (0.4596)
rho -0.2597 0.0229 -0.5600 0.0149
(p-value) 0.2002 0.6396 0.0373 b 0.5015
Event Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
likelihood -5856.74 -5770.75 -5845.09 -5770.12
NOB 2186 2186 2186 2186
Censored 212 212 212 212
Notes:
Significance at 1%,5% and 11% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c".
The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. 






Event year dummies are included in both primary and selection equation as for
sample selection model.Table6　Consolidation pattern and bank performance
Panel A: Change of ROA
Dependent variable Change of ROA from T-1 to T+2 or T+3
Window [T-1, T+2] [T-1, T+3] [T-1, T+2] [T-1, T+3] [T-1, T+2] [T-1, T+3]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
(Consolidation pattern dummy)
Policy-promoted & Absorbing -0.3545 -0.3058
(0.241) (0.3106)
Policy-promoted & Merger of equals -1.0123 a -1.2947 a
(0.3142) (0.4482)
Strategic & Absorbing 0.3521 0.4168
(0.3274) (0.3352)
Strategic & Merger of equals   -0.0876 -0.8016
(0.7035) (0.9961)
Policy-promoted & One-to-one -0.4157 b -0.5276 c
(0.2021) (0.2786)
Policy-promoted & More than two  -1.0769 b -1.0137 c
(0.4644) (0.6052)
Strategic & One-to-one 0.2979 0.2493
(0.3339) (0.386)
Strategic & More than two -0.2613 -0.7863
(0.1846) (0.6936)
Policy-promoted & In-market -0.677 a -0.7707 b
(0.2347) (0.3228)
Policy-promoted & Out-of-market  -0.2175 -0.1779
(0.2713) (0.2674)
Strategic & In-market -0.2833 -0.4427
(0.308) (0.3883)
Strategic & Out-of-market 0.982 b 1.0021 b
(0.4769) (0.5086)
LN(ASSET) 0.2301 a 0.2351 a 0.2325 a 0.24 a 0.2301 a 0.2368 a
(0.0754) (0.0706) (0.0752) (0.0706) (0.0753) (0.0706)
URBAN 0.4908 a 0.5521 a 0.4922 a 0.5584 a 0.4936 a 0.5588 a
(0.1792) (0.1773) (0.1795) (0.1782) (0.1793) (0.1779)
⊿BRANCH 0.0644 b 0.0583 0.064 b 0.0606 0.0646 b 0.0599
(0.0315) (0.0474) (0.0319) (0.0479) (0.0311) (0.047)
INTERCEPT -0.4654 b -0.4305 c -0.4558 b -0.4186 c -0.4729 b -0.4384 c
(0.2153) (0.2314) (0.2159) (0.2321) (0.2157) (0.2317)
Event Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.052 0.082 0.052 0.081 0.052 0.082
NOB (consolidated/other) 152/1822 152/1822 152/1822 152/1822 152/1822 152/1822
Notes: Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c".The figures in parentheses are robust
standard errors   Significance levels are reported for two-tail tests. As for variables, see appendix.Table6　Consolidation pattern and bank performance
Panel B: Deposit Growth Rate
Dependent Variable Deposit Growth Rate
Window [T-1, T+2] [T-1, T+3] [T-1, T+2] [T-1, T+3] [T-1, T+2] [T-1, T+3]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
(Consolidation pattern dummy)
Policy-promoted & Absorbing 6.5964 b 3.4242
(3.1262) (3.6891)
Policy-promoted & Merger of equals 8.6484 b 9.2367 c
(4.3406) (5.4936)
Strategic & Absorbing 6.1367 4.8949
(4.895) (5.1322)
Strategic & Merger of equals   -6.316 0.4293
(8.0399) (9.0183)
Policy-promoted & One-to-one 8.1472 a 5.5468 c
(2.786) (3.3151)
Policy-promoted & More than two  4.7074 4.9003
(5.7016) (7.2049)
Strategic & One-to-one 2.6516 4.1971
(4.516) (4.7283)
Strategic & More than two 6.8589 -0.7592
(17.7359) (17.3092)
Policy-promoted & In-market 6.3 b 2.5138
(2.6765) (3.2515)
Policy-promoted & Out-of-market  11.1973 16.7353 b
(6.8589) (7.8209)
Strategic & In-market 3.1567 4.6471
(4.6701) (5.126)
Strategic & Out-of-market 2.8501 2.4778
(8.1657) (8.0936)
LN(ASSET) 1.7466 b 3.4722 a 1.7558 b 3.4594 a 1.7434 b 3.4101 a
(0.7036) (0.7502) (0.7029) (0.7486) (0.7053) (0.7514)
URBAN -0.7506 -1.9893 -0.7182 -2.012 -0.7296 -2.0584
(2.5889) (2.7079) (2.5847) (2.703) (2.588) (2.7061)
⊿BRANCH 2.9552 a 3.5022 a 2.9557 a 3.4994 a 2.9609 a 3.4792 a
(0.5023) (0.5196) (0.5047) (0.5192) (0.5067) (0.5233)
INTERCEPT -23.5082 b -57.6983 a -23.656 b -57.5 a -23.456 b -56.726 a
(10.2302) (11.0269) (10.2186) (11) (10.2579) (11.0469)
Event Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.063 0.057 0.063 0.057 0.063 0.058
NOB (consolidated/other) 164/2022 164/2022 164/2022 164/2022 164/2022 164/2022
Notes: Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "a" "b" and "c".The figures in parentheses are robust
standard errors   Significance levels are reported for two-tail tests. As for variables, see appendix.Appendix  Definition of variables
Panel A  Basic Variables
Variable






Panel B  Consolidation pattern dummy
Policy-promoted 
Strategic
Absorbing The form of the consolidation was an absorption or an acquisition.
Merger of equals The form of the consolidation was a combination into a new one.
One-to-one The number of the participants was two.
More than two The number of the participants was more than two.
Out-of-market
In-market
All participants met the minimum capital criterion set by the Bank Law in
1927.
Change of the ratio of profit to total assets  from year T-1 to year T+2 or
T+3, where the profit is the profit of the second half of the fiscal year,
multiplied by two. The value of total assets in year T+2 or T+3 is modified
according to footnote 26.
Explanation
 At least one head office or branch office, overlapped in the same city or
country.
Book value of capital plus total deposits. Capital equals to the sum of
paid-in capital, reserved fund and the profit.
Change of the number of branches from year T-1 to year T+2 or yearT+3.
Dummy variable which equals 1, if the bank was consolidated one, and 0,
otherwise.
Dummy variable which equals 1, if the bank’s head office was located in
Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, Kyoto, or Hyogo prefecture, and 0,
otherwise.
Each consolidation pattern dummy is a variable which equals 1, if the consolidation satisfied each
of the following condition, and 0 otherwise.
At least one participant bank did not meet the minimum capital criterion set
by the Bank Law in 1927.
None of head offices or  branch offices of the participants overlapped in
the same city or country.